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Abstract 
In recent years much attention has been paid to firms’ environmental profile. Implementing and 
improving firm’s environmental profile are twofold. First, launching the environmental governance is 
a foundation for firm’s environmental profile. Second, the characteristics of board of directors 
directly affect the decisions made by board on all firm’s performance. Drawing on the resource-
dependence theory and agency theory, board characteristics represent board resource-provision 
role and board monitoring role.  
This paper aims to understand how the board monitoring and board resource-provision roles 
influence firm’s environmental governance for 267 US firms from 2010 to 2012. The findings confirm 
that effective boards increase their monitoring of management when there are more independent 
directors on the board, higher CEO–chairman duality, higher share ownership for insiders and the 
CEO and finally lower share ownership for outsider–directors. Boards with strong social network 
connections, larger board size and lower board tenure are classified as resource-rich boards. The 
results also confirm that resource-rich boards with effective monitoring roles tend to have a board, 
or a committee appointed by the board that is responsible for environmental initiatives, paying 
incentives for the management of climate change issues, publishing information in annual reports, 
voluntary communications and other regulatory filings.  
 
Keywords: Board social network, Environmental governance, Board characteristics, Resource-
dependence theory, Agency theory, Data mining. 
1 Introduction 
Most activities of firms are associated with multiple impacts on the environment. Although the 
impacts vary across sectors and subsectors, firms pay more attention to environmental issues that 
matter to investors, shareholders, customers and the greater society. During recent decades, firms 
have increased their attempts to measure and report their environmental profiles. This is evidenced 
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by increasing firm participation in environmental voluntary initiatives, publishing their 
environmental activities, adopting the ISO 14001 as the international benchmark of environmental 
management systems, and self-regulation as a set of internal goals and initiatives.  
The literature on companies’ environmental profile is vast, offering a rich list of explanations for the 
relationship between environmental and financial profile of companies. Although a large number of 
empirical studies have provided evidence of positive relationship (e.g. (Hourneaux et al., 2014), 
(Iatridis 2013)); others have shown a negative relationship (e.g. (Chen et al. 2014), (Sariannidis et al. 
2013)) or even have supported insignificant results (e.g. (Böhringer et al. 2012), (Post et al. 2011)). A 
key insight from the literature is that studies only focused on the outcomes of environmental profile 
for example CO2 emission, KLD environmental concerns or KLD environmental strengths and usually 
ignore the fact that environmental profile is multidimensional.  
In addition, given the fact that the board of directors is responsible for protecting shareholders’ 
interests and making decisions about major firm issues, implementing and developing the 
environmental profile of the firm is an agenda for the board of directors. It is a mission of the board 
to develop the firms’ environmental profile by providing knowledge and other resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978; de Villiers et al. 2011) and ensuring that management endeavours to address the 
environmental agenda (Russo and Harrison 2005; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009). 
 Hillman and Dalziel (2003) propose two roles for the board, namely: (i) monitoring management 
(based on the agency theory); and (ii) facilitating access to the resources and information (based on 
the resource-dependence theory). Accordingly, the board plays both roles in relation to developing 
an environmental profile. A key insight is that the characteristics of board and the roles they are 
playing in decision making are not fully considered by previous literature. 
The aim of this paper is to further our understanding of those aspects of board of directors that refer 
to distinct but interrelated features that are important in considering,  developing and maintaining a 
company’s environmental performance. Therefoe, in this study, we use a set of board characteristics 
to represent the monitoring role of the board, which are board independence, CEO–chairman 
duality and director ownerships. In respect to the board’s resource-provision role, we use two sets 
of board characteristics, namely, human capital (static) and social capital (relational) characteristics 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The former refers to a set of characteristics for each individual board and 
includes board size and board tenure. The latter is the social network between firms, which refers to 
the position of the firm in relation to other firms and how this position in the network helps the 
board to facilitate access to resources and information. We then relate the two board roles to firms’ 
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environmental governance. We refer to environmental governance as a set of mechanisms and 
processes aimed at changes in environmental-related knowledge, decision-making and behaviours 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006). When firms put environmental governance into practice, this is a sign of 
concern for the environmental profile of the firm. The implementation of environmental governance 
could be translated into: (i) assigning an individual or committee responsible for environmental 
initiatives, practices and progress; (ii) the presence of environmental incentives; and (iii) publishing 
the firm’s climate change reports. 
Our study offers four key contributions. First, it expands on board literature and follows (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003) framework to integrate both roles of the board of directors, namely, the monitoring 
function (based on agency theory) and providing resources (based on resource-dependence theory). 
The main reason is that these two roles of boards do not work in isolation and are often interrelated. 
This study is inspired by the work of (de Villiers et al. 2011). However, in this research we devote 
resource dependent role to human capitals (board size and board’s tenure) and social capitals (social 
network). 
Second, this paper contributes to the current literature on analysing the relationship between board 
social networks and firm environmental performance (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. 2012)(Diaz et al. 
2013)(Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa 2013)(Walls and Hoffman 2013)(Shahgholian et al. 
2014)(Shahgholian et al. 2014). 
Third, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to focus on environmental governance, 
while other studies mainly focused on the outcome of environmental activities such as CO2 emission, 
KLD environmental concerns or KLD environmental Strengths.  
Forth, while most existing research works use multiple regression analysis, our study take advantage 
of state-of-the-art data mining technique to generate better predictive models than currently 
reported ones in the literature. In addition, utilising data mining technique is in line with the respond 
to a call from the literature to investigate “when” it is possible to improve environmental profile 
(Lankoski 2008) by highlighting the patterns between board characteristics and environmental 
governance.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data sample and variables. Section 4 presents the analysis and interpretation of 
results, and Section 5 concludes the paper, describing potential areas for further research. 
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2 Background, Theory and Hypotheses 
In general, the board decision-making process is extremely complex and it is widely recognised that 
the characteristics of the board of directors have a direct impact on the decisions made by the 
board. Despite the number of studies conducted on boards of directors, there is still a quest for a 
deeper understanding of what drives board task performance (Pugliese et al. 2014). Recent 
developments in the field of firm’s environmental profiles have led to an examination of the role of 
the board of directors in relation to firms’ environmental performance (de Villiers et al. 2011; J. 
Walls et al. 2012). Many studies investigating the relationship between firm profile and 
environmental profile examine some of the board characteristics as firm profile. Because the focus 
of this study is only on board characteristics, we consider those studies that focus only on board 
characteristics in relation to firms’ environmental profile. For example, three studies examine the 
CEO salary and compensation package in relation to environmental performance (Cordeiro and 
Sarkis 2008; Berrone and Gomez-Mejia 2009; J. L. Walls et al. 2012). There are four other studies 
examining a subset of directors’ characteristics such as diversity, board independence, board size, 
board compensation, CEO–duality, insider/outsider directors, directors’ average age and education 
(Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez 2010; Post et al. 2011; Post et al. 2014; Zou et al. 2014). All these 
studies provide some insights into the relationship between the characteristics of the board of 
directors and the firm’s environmental profile. All of them suffer from analysing a narrow set of 
board characteristics. de Villiers et al. (2011) examine a more complete set of board characteristics, 
investigating the relationship between strong environmental performance and board characteristics 
that capture boards’ monitoring and resource-provision abilities in respect to strong environmental 
performance and the related strategic opportunities. They define the environmental profile for each 
firm, which indicates whether a firm displays any of five environmental strengths reported in the 
KLD database. They analyse the sample of US publicly traded firms indexed in S&P with data 
coverage on the KLD database for the 2003 and 2004 fiscal years. Their findings confirm that 
environmental strengths are positively and significantly related to director independence, and 
negatively and significantly related to directors appointed after the CEO. However, environmental 
strengths are insignificantly related to CEO–chair duality. Moreover, the results indicate an 
insignificant relationship between environmental strengths and CEO–director ownership, insider–
director ownership or outsider–director ownership. The findings do not provide strong support for 
the association between multiple directorships and board tenure in relation to environmental 
strengths. On the other hand, environmental strengths have a positive association with board size, 
an active CEO and law experts.  
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Research examining the impact of social network profile on environmental profile has received 
attention since 2012 and is therefore still at a developmental stage. The first study examining the 
impacts of director interlocks on firms’ adoption of proactive environmental strategies was 
conducted in 2012 by (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. 2012). A sample of 90 US electric firms were 
classified as investor-owned firms in 2005. In this research, director interlocks are measured as the 
number of interlocking ties with other firms and define four types of supplier with director 
interlocks, namely, green equipment suppliers, firms providing a knowledge-intensive business 
service, financial institutions and fossil fuel suppliers. The reported analysis confirms that interlocks 
with green equipment suppliers have a positive impact on proactive environmental strategies. Three 
other types of interlock show negative relationships with proactive environmental strategies. 
Similarly, (Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa 2013) analysed a sample of 93 US electric firms in 
2005.They define director interlocks as the number of interlocking ties with other firms.Their 
findings confrim that firms with a higher number of interlocking director ties have a positive 
relationship with environmental performance, measured as a percentage of global warming 
potential divided by annual net generation. In addition, the firm’s diversity interlock ties have a 
positive relationship with environmental performance. Walls and Hoffman (2013) examine the 
association between the social networks of the board of directors and positive environmental 
deviance. The research analyses 294 US firms from 2000 to 2008 and interlocking directorship is 
used to define the social network between firms. On this basis, they calculate degree centrality and 
eigenvector centrality. The findings indicate that more central firms, measured by either degree or 
eigenvector centrality in the network, are less likely to deviate positively from normal environmental 
practices in the institutional field. In 2013, Diaz et al. (2013) examined the role of social networks on 
environmental performance, analysing 310 S&P1500 firms in the year 2008. Their definition of social 
network is that two firms are considered socially connected if they share at least one director or if 
one or more of their directors sit in a third firm in which another S&P1500 firm director also sits. The 
findings show that firms that are socially connected have better environmental performance, as well 
as financial performance, measured by return on equity (ROE). In addition, socially connected firms 
pay incentives related to climate change, publishing information related to climate change and 
including information on their annual reports, and there is a responsible individual or team for 
climate change issues. Shahgholian et al. (2014) examined how the social network between firms (as 
one of the board characteristics) could impact the environmental performance of 202 S&P1500 firms 
in the year 2011. In this work the “Current Employment (CE) Network of S&P companies” is defined 
as follows: two SP firms are linked through a director if two firms share the same director. This is the 
traditional interlocking directorship network. Moreover, if directors from two firms sit on the board 
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of a third firm, this will also form the CE of SP firms. The findings confirm that those firms with better 
social connections pay higher compensation and environmental incentives; they have a higher 
number of independent directors, publish annual reports and are willing to have voluntary 
communications. In addition, they have committees responsible for climate change. 
2.1 Environmental Governance 
In this study, we use three variables to describe environmental governance, namely, environmental 
responsibility team, paying environmental incentives and publishing environmental reports.  
2.1.1 Environmental Responsibility Individual/Team 
The purpose of an environmental committee is systematically to plan, implement and review 
sustainability policies and activities (Liao et al. 2014). Consequently, an existing environmental 
committee could help to prevent the agency problem. The environmental committee is likely to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of environmental initiatives and provide more 
transparent and consistent environmental information. This could help the board of directors to 
prioritise environmental plans. When the board is directly responsible for environmental issues or 
there is a committee appointed by the board, it is more likely that the board will guarantee the 
development of an environmental profile by monitoring management. In addition, an environmental 
committee may enhance the awareness of employees about the environmental aspects of their jobs 
and responsibilities to reduce negative impacts. Such committees have the authority to set up 
monetary and non-financial rewards to encourage employees to take action in environmental 
activities (Liao et al. 2014). 
2.1.2 Environmental Incentives 
The role of paying financial incentives to motivate employees to take particular actions is evidenced 
by previous research (Conyon 2006). Paying environmental incentives could help to promote their 
sustainable management. Introducing an environmental incentive scheme can help to bring 
shareholders’ interests and employers’ behaviour closer together and minimise the agency problem. 
Firms may have several incentives to voluntarily improving environmental performance (Khanna and 
Anton 2002). In addition, firms may have an incentive to show themselves as being environmentally 
responsible (Rodrigue et al. 2013). Depending on the board’s knowledge of employees’ behaviour, it 
can design an appropriate reward scheme, either for all the employees or for a specific group such 
as a sustainability team or senior managers.  
2.1.3 Environmental Reporting 
As part of firms’ environmental governance, they have a set of key performance indicators (KPIs) to 
evaluate the success of environmental activities. Therefore, firms attempt to collect, measure, 
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manage and evaluate against KPIs and then report their environmental information. This process 
provides more transparency and comparability in their environmental profile (Matisoff et al. 2013). 
When the board has access to more reliable and up-to-date environmental information, it has more 
opportunities to monitor management in relation to developing an environmental profile. Firms 
usually publish their environmental reports through annual reports, voluntary reports or other 
regulatory fillings (Carbon Disclosure Project 2014), with the aim of providing insights into the main 
impacts on both the firm profile and the environment. 
2.2 Board Characteristics 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and the Monitoring Function 
Management can pursue its own interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests. One way to 
check such managerial activities and consequently improve firm performance is to employ 
monitoring and incentive-alignment mechanisms (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The antecedent of the 
monitoring function is board incentives in order to motivate the board to protect shareholder 
interests (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). When board members are independent from the firm, they are 
more active in their monitoring responsibility (de Villiers et al. 2011). In addition, the evidence from 
agency theory shows that share ownership (equity compensation) is another motivation for board 
members to monitor management activities and decisions.  
In recent years, environmental performance has been one of the major concerns of firms. However, 
the direct use of agency theory in the environmental profile of firms is scarce. Environmental 
performance requires significant investment, which might have uncertain outcomes and generally 
does not have immediate returns. Management are not interested in this sort of investment, which 
does not have short-term financial benefits to help increase their reputation and financial incentives. 
Therefore, it is important for boards to monitor and focus on decisions related to environmental 
performance. In this study, we consider board independence, CEO–chairman duality and share 
ownership as board characteristics with monitoring functions in relation to firm environmental 
profile. 
Board independence. It is confirmed that because outside directors are independent from 
management, they are willing to monitor management more carefully and protect shareholder 
interests (Duchin et al. 2010)(Ienciu et al. 2012)(J. Walls et al. 2012). Previous studies have 
investigated the role of independent directors on firm performance (Armstrong et al. 2014)(Wang 
2014)(Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. 2015). In relation to environmental performance, de Villiers et al. 
(2011) argue that a board with a higher concentration of independent directors is more likely to 
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have direct knowledge and expertise of monitoring environmental performance and pursuing the 
available environmental opportunities. However, Walls et al. (2012) show that a larger number of 
independent directors generally undermines environmental performance. 
CEO–chairman duality. When the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board, the 
combination of the two roles provides significant power for the CEO. The main argument against 
CEO–chairman duality is based on agency theory, which predicts that CEOs, as agents of 
shareholders, do not always act in the best interests of shareholders. Supporting this conflict-of-
interest argument, previous studies have found that the combination of the CEO and chairman 
positions undermines the checks and balances in the top management of the firm (Romano and 
Guerrini 2012), and the board has less power to remove poorly performing managers (Goyal and 
Park 2002). A CEO who is also chairman of the board has more power to pursue a self-interested 
agenda and postpone other initiatives such as environmental investment with a long payback 
period. 
Share ownership (insider–director ownership, outsider–director ownership, CEO–director ownership). 
Employee-share ownership refers to employees owning a proportion of their firms’ shares (Poulain-
Rehm and Lepers 2013). The primary goal of share ownership is to align everyone’s interests on firm 
performance. Therefore, directors with greater share ownership are likely to focus on firm 
performance, because their decisions impact their own wealth. In support of this, prior research 
shows that a board with significant share ownership monitors CEO performance and is more likely to 
link CEO pay to firm performance (Bahaghat and Black 1999). More relevant to our study, Westphal 
(1999) and de Villiers et al. (2011) confirm that director ownership improves boards’ monitoring of 
strategic decision-making. Therefore, directors with high share ownership are likely to support 
environmental initiatives. de Villiers et al. (2011, p.1644) state that “in the current climate of 
heightened environmental awareness, it is plausible that higher ownership could motivate directors 
to pursue green product and process innovations with potential to enhance shareholder value in the 
long run”. In this study, we follow (Shivdasani 1993) and (de Villiers et al. 2011) and analyse the 
CEO–director ownership, insider–director ownership and outsider–director ownership separately. 
Insider–directors usually have large ownership; outsider–directors have small share ownership; and 
CEO ownership is also examined separately from the remaining insider–directors to consider the 
possible impacts of CEO ownership in relation to environmental performance. 
Monitoring hypothesis: Firms are more likely to have better environmental governance as the 
monitoring role of their board increases. 
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2.2.2 Resource-Dependence Theory and the Provision of Resource Function 
A second board role is the provision of resources adopted by scholars in the resource-dependence 
theory. Resource-dependence theory is premised on the notion that all organisations critically 
depend on other organisations for the provision of vital resources (Drees and Heugens 2013). The 
primary concern of resource-dependence theory is board capital, which consists of both human 
capital and relational capital (or social capital)(Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The former refers to 
directors’ experience, expertise and reputation, while the latter is the network of ties to other firms 
and external contingencies (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Therefore, a larger board can bring more 
experience and knowledge to the board and offer better advice (Dalton et al. 1999). Board interlocks 
are likely to enhance coordination with important resource providers, primarily by providing an 
exchange channel of tacit or sensitive information and greater social cohesion between the key 
decision-makers representing the interlocked organisations (Mizruchi 1996)(Drees and Heugens 
2013). 
In terms of firms’ environmental performance, there are significant differences between directors’ 
experiences. Resource-rich directors are more likely to have knowledge of environmental issues and 
other firms’ environmental agendas, which could help the board to plan environmental 
development. The contribution of at least one member into environmental practices could have a 
significant impact on the firm’s environmental initiatives. This study considers board size, board 
tenure and board social networks as board characteristics related to the director’s ability to facilitate 
access to the additional information and resources required for environmental performance. 
Board size. Early research using resource-dependence theory focuses on board size as an indicator 
of the board’s ability to provide resources to the firm (Hillman et al. 2009). A larger board offers 
more experience and knowledge and, consequently, better advice during the decision-making 
process (Ienciu et al. 2012)(J. Walls et al. 2012). Therefore, larger boards are likely to have some 
directors with a certain level of environmental knowledge or directors that can provide access to the 
relevant resources and knowledge. Directors with such expertise can influence the board in relation 
to the opportunities and challenges of an environmental agenda. In addition, (de Villiers et al. 2011) 
support the positive impact of a large board on better environmental performance.  
Board tenure. Longer director tenure means a long-term commitment to the firm. Directors with 
longer tenure are the source of knowledge about a firm’s past performance and resources. 
Therefore, they can help the board with developing knowledge based on the firm’s resources and 
performance in the past. However, along with this significant aspect of board tenure, there are also 
some negative aspects. Some studies suggest that long tenure is associated with less flexibility 
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regarding change (Musteen et al. 2006). In addition, (Golden and Zajac 2001, p.1090) confirm that 
extended tenure of board members is associated with greater rigidity, and can result in 
entrenchment behind existing practices and procedures, with directors distancing themselves from 
new ideas. In such situations, a board with longer tenure may not be sufficiently flexible to establish 
an environmental agenda. Directors with shorter tenure have served on the boards of other firms 
more recently and therefore it is more likely to have more information related to the environmental 
initiatives of those firms. 
Social networks. Social networks may facilitate value creation through the combination and 
exchange of resources (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Social networks enable the diffusion of knowledge, 
guide the allocation of resources and build consensus around best practice (Scott 2014). Social 
network analysis is the quantitative method used to build the social network profile of the board, 
which describes the position and behavioural characteristics of the board in relation to other firms in 
the network. The position of firms in the network is measured using social network centrality 
metrics, which are degree, betweenness, closeness and eigenvector (Shahgholian et al. 2015). The 
more centrally the firm is located, the more access it has to information and resources in the 
network (Granovetter 1985)(Walls and Hoffman 2013). The most recent empirical studies have 
linked director social networking profile to almost every important aspect of management and 
financial behaviour of firms, including shareholder value (Fogel et al. 2014), corporate finance policy 
decisions (Fracassi 2015), firm value (Fracassi and Tate 2012)(Larcker et al. 2013), CEO compensation 
(Hwang and Kim 2009)(Horton et al. 2012), director appointment (Qi 2011) and mergers and 
acquisitions (Fracassi and Tate 2012). 
In the context of environmental initiatives, when the board is centrally positioned in the network, it 
can gain access to more information about environmental initiatives directly and find out more 
about other firms’ environmental activities and developments. To the best of our knowledge, the 
research examining the impact of the social network profile on environmental profile has received 
attention since 2012 and is therefore still at a developmental stage (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. 
2012)(Diaz et al. 2013)(Ortiz-de-Mandojana and Aragon-Correa 2013)(Walls and Hoffman 
2013)(Shahgholianet al. 2014)(Shahgholianet al. 2014). Despite the differences in defining social 
networks and using a variety of social network metrics, as well as various environmental profile 
measurements, they all confirm the positive impacts of board social networking on the firm’s 
environmental profile.  
Resource provision hypothesis: Firms are more likely to have better environmental governance as 
the resource provision role of their board increases. 
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3 Research Method 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our initial sample was based on 4,233 firm-year observations listed as S&P1500 firms, based on 
BoardEx (BoardEx 2016) data from 2009 to 2011. We used mainly BoardEx data to build social 
networks at firm level. In the next step, we merged social network data with environmental 
governance data derived from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) (Carbon Disclosure Project 2013). 
Therefore, our sample reduced to 832 firm-year observations. The main reason for this is that it is 
mainly S&P500 firms that report their environmental data to the CDP. Finally, we eliminated 60 firms 
without board governance data on the RiskMetrics. The final database consisted of an unbalanced 
panel data set of 267 firms from 2010 to 2012. We lagged board characteristics data by one year to 
allow for changes in environmental governance to take place based on the board characteristics in 
the previous year. Each record contains metrics related to the board’s social network, a number of 
board characteristics and environmental governance subject areas. The sample was restricted to the 
S&P1500 firms. The distribution of countries reveals that 99.05 per cent of the examined firms were 
from the US. The data covers 10 different industries classified by Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) code; the largest representatives are financial (15.37% of firms), information 
technology (14.01%), consumer discretionary (12.24%) and industry (12.24%), health care (10.75%), 
utilities (10.34%), consumer staples (10.07%), materials (8.03%) and energy (5.44%) industries. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
Figure 1 presents the variables and steps followed in this research. As it is discussed before, we 
consider two roles for board of directors. In order to define each role, a set of variables is employed. 
We employed data-mining techniques to model the impact of board characteristics on 
environmental governance. The methodology used in this analysis is a progressive clustering analysis 
approach. First, the K-Means (Alonso & Shuster, 2002) algorithm was applied using only social 
network attributes as inputs to identify two initial clusters of firms, called socially connected and 
socially independent. Next, we applied the K-Means algorithm to the identified clusters in the 
previous step and a set of variables representing the board’s resource-dependence characteristics. 
Two clusters are identified as follow: board with poor resource provision role and board with high 
resource provision role. In addition, firms were profiled by the set of board-monitoring 
characteristics and two specific clusters are identified which are board with high monitoring role and 
board with lower monitoring role. At this point, there were two sets of clusters for board monitoring 
and board resource-provision roles. In the final stage, the firm’s environmental governance profile 
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was formed by applying the K-Means algorithm to a set of environmental governance attributes and 
the board-monitoring and board resource-provision profiles of firms. Some additional analysis is 
shown on the relationships between the type of incentives and the individual or group entitled for 
that type of incentive. 
 
3.3 Variable Measurement 
A brief description of the variables used in this study is presented in this section. 
Environmental Governance data. Environmental problems are often extremely complex and this is 
widely recognised as a multidimensional problem. While previous research focused mainly on 
environmental performance, including CO2 emissions (Fujii et al. 2013)(Pintea et al. 2014)(Misani 
and Pogutz 2015), GHG emissions (Hatakeda et al. 2012), environmental disclosure (Cong and 
Freedman 2011) and environmental management (Busch and Hoffmann 2011)(Uhlaner et al. 
2012)(Tao and Zhang 2014), the focus of this study is on firms’ environmental governance. 
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Monitoring Role Resource Provision Role 
Variables:  
Director Independence 
CEO-chairman duality 
CEO-director ownership 
Insider-director ownership 
Outsider-director ownership 
Modelling: 
Clustering 
Variables:  
Human capital (static): 
 Board size 
 Board tenure 
Social Capital (relational): 
 Board social network 
Modelling: 
Clustering 
 
Output: 
Board with High monitoring role 
Board with Low monitoring role 
 
Output: 
Board with rich resource provision role 
Board with poor resource provision role 
 
Environmental Governance 
Variables: 
i. Responsible team for climate change: 
    (Values: Board/ Senior managers/ Other managers/ No one) 
 
ii. Pay incentives 
    (Values:  
             No 
             Yes: two more variables: 
                     type of incentives              Who is entitled for the incentive 
    ) 
 
iii. Publishing information 
      (Values: Annual reports/ Voluntary communications/ Other regulatory fillings) 
 
 
Figure 1. Detailed steps and methodology 
 
The environmental governance data was obtained from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The 
CDP’s data is used extensively in academic research (Kim and Lyon 2011)(Diaz et al. 2013)(Lee et al. 
2013)(Shahgholianet al. 2014). The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is a UK-based, not-for-profit-
organisation, formed in 2000 as a United Nations initiative. Its mission is to gather and disseminate 
climate change information in an effort to create a unified response to global warming (Carbon 
Disclosure Project 2013). One category of questions is related to firm environmental governance and 
Board of directors’ Roles 
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includes cc_responsibility, pay_incentives, intentives_type, incentives_entitiled, 
publishing_cc_reports. 
cc_responsibility was constructed based on the firms’ responses to this CDP question: “Where is the 
highest level of direct responsibility for climate change within your company?” Firms had four 
choices to identify the position of the individual or name of the committee with this responsibility, 
namely, (i) board: the board or other committee appointed by the board; (ii) senior manager/officer; 
(iii) other manager/officer; and (iv) no individual or committee.  
pay_incentives was constructed based on the CDP question: “Do you provide incentives for the 
management of climate change issues, including the attainment of targets?” Firms responded to this 
question by selecting “Yes” or “No”. 
intentives_type. If firms responded that employees could benefit from incentive programmes related 
to climate change, they were asked to provide information about the types of incentive they were 
paying. The former question contains a set of predefined categories, namely, monetary, recognition 
(non-monetary) or other non-monetary incentives. The CDP defines monetary incentives as a bonus 
or some form of financial remuneration; recognition (non-monetary): employee award (e.g. 
employee of the year) or career-progression scheme, but not tied directly to any form of financial 
remuneration; other non-monetary reward, including increased holiday allowances, special 
assignments, parking allocations, and so on. These definitions are also supported by (I1988)and 
(Gomez-Mejia, Luis R, Balkin David B1995). 
incentives_entitiled. In addition, firms had to identify who is entitled to benefit from the selected 
incentives. The CDP provided 17 predefined categories of employee for this question. In this 
research we grouped them into four main categories, as follows: 
i. Board: board chairman; board/executive board; director on board; corporate executive team; 
CEO; COO; executive officer; management group. 
ii. Sustainability team: energy managers; environmental sustainability managers; risk managers; 
other. 
iii. Other managers: business unit managers; facilities managers; process operation managers; public 
affairs managers. 
iv. All employees: all employees. 
publishing_cc_reports. Firms were asked about communication of their position on climate change 
and carbon emissions outside their CDP response. They had to answer the following question: “Have 
you published information about your company’s response to climate change and GHG emissions 
performance for this reporting year in places other than in your CDP response? If so, please attach 
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the publication(s)”. In this study, we brought the firms’ responses to the same level of detail and 
created three main categories, namely: (i) annual reports refer to the mandatory annual financial 
reporting, published to meet regulatory obligations;(ii) voluntary communication if firms have 
published optional sustainability/CSR reports; (iii) other regulatory filings are those required through 
regional or national legislation, examples being the SEC filing in the US, reports made under the 
AB32 and EPA federal reporting rule, ETS regulation submissions, or Victorian Energy Efficiency 
Target (VEET) filings in Australia. 
It was chosen to use binary representation of the variables in all the experiments, facilitating easier 
manipulation and aggregation. The value of this variable ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 shows that the 
firm publishes its climate change information in all of the three categories, and 0 shows that the firm 
is not publishing in any of them. 
Board characteristics data. We employed two sets of board variables in this study. The first set of 
board variables measured board monitoring and incentives, as discussed under agency theory, 
including director independence, CEO–chair duality, CEO–director ownership, insider–director 
ownership and outsider–director ownership. The measurement of these variables was consistent 
with prior research (de Villiers et al. 2011). All the variables were calculated based on the 
RiskMetrics dataset. 
Director independence is measured as a percentage of the number of independent directors on the 
board. CEO–chair duality is coded as 1if the CEO also serves as the board chairman, and otherwise as 
0.CEO–director ownership captures the percentage of the total number of shares held by a board 
member who is also the firm’s CEO. Insider–director ownership is measured as the cumulative 
percentage of the total number of shares held by the remaining executive (i.e. non-CEOs) board 
members. Similarly, outsider–director ownership is the cumulative percentage of the total 
outstanding shares held by outsider (i.e. non-executive) board members. 
The second set of board variables measures the provision of resources by directors, as discussed 
under resource-dependence theory, and includes board size, board tenure and board social 
network. Board tenure is calculated based on the available data from the RiskMetrics database and 
other metrics are calculated using the BoardEx dataset. 
Board size is the number of directors on the board. Board tenure is measured as the average number 
of years the firm’s directors have served on the board(de Villiers et al. 2011). Boardroom social 
network is defined and calculated as follows.  
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We obtained information on firms’ board of directors from the BoardEx dataset, which keeps 
information about individuals, mainly from the USA and Europe, who work in publicly quoted firms 
and major private entities at board of director and executive management levels. The information 
includes in-depth profiles such as academic qualifications, current and past job positions, 
membership of professional and other bodies, and is collected and revised semi-automatically by 
analysts in charge of collecting, processing and updating information about such individuals. Once 
the information is validated, BoardEx provides business networking services to firms and individuals 
wishing to obtain information about certain individuals and their contacts (positive interpersonal 
ties) and the relationship of their contacts with other individuals (social network). Using BoardEx 
data from 2009 to 2011, we built an undirected and unweighted social network at board level, 
defined as follows: 
“Current Employment (CE) Network of S&P firms”. Two S&P firms are linked through a director if 
two firms share the same director. This is the traditional interlocking directorship network. 
Moreover, if directors from two firms sit on the board of a third company, this will form the CE of 
S&P firms as well. Multiple links between two S&P firms through different S&P directors are 
assumed to be the same. Table 1 reports the summary statistics on the CE network for S&P1500 
firms. On average, we have 1,411 firms and 1,380 directors per year. After building the social 
network at firm level through the social ties of board members, we are able to capture the firm’s 
position in relation to others on the entire network by calculating degree centrality, betweenness 
centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector (Shahgholian et al. 2015). 
Year 2009 2010 2011 
#Firms 1,408 1,411 1,414 
#Links 27,253 27,628 28,143 
#Directors 1,378 1,383 1,380 
Size of largest component 1,400 1,405 1,407 
Table 1. Summary statistics of CE network characteristics 
 
4 Results 
Table 2 displays the results of the first step in the clustering analysis framework for each year. The 
recorded Silhouette Coefficient evaluates the clustering model in each year. Based on this score we 
can see that clusters in each year have fair quality. We can distinguish two clusters in each year. The 
first cluster (C1) described the firms that are not particularly well connected. Compared to the 
second cluster (C2), they have fewer direct links to other firms (degree), their neighbours are also 
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not very well connected to the rest of the network directly (eigenvector), they have less direct 
access to the rest of the network (closeness) and they participate less in transmitting information 
between other firms in the network (betweenness). Therefore, the first cluster (C1) is defined as a 
“socially independent” (SI) cluster and the second as a “socially connected” (SC) cluster. The clusters 
in each year follow the same pattern. 
The size of socially connected clusters is smaller than socially independent clusters in each year, but 
the size gradually increases over the year from 39.1 per cent in 2009 to 42.1 per cent in 2011. The 
increased size can be interpreted as the social network evolution of firms over time, where more 
firms are connected based on their connection in this year, and therefore there will be a greater 
number of socially connected firms. In addition, the social network metrics are sorted by overall 
importance. Therefore, someone can conclude that degree and eigenvector are the most important 
metrics in each year to form the clusters. Closeness and betweenness have the same order in 2009 
and 2011, while in 2010 betweenness is more important than closeness to form the clusters.  
 2009 2010 2011 
Silhouette 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Cluster number Metrics C1 C2 Metrics C1 C2 Metrics C1 C2 
Cluster size (%) 60.9 39.1 60.2 39.8 57.9 42.1 
 D 54.00 123.00 D 50.46 119.98 D 48.75 116.57 
E 3.45 9.74 E 3.23 9.37 E 3.08 9.04 
C 42.10 46.85 B 0.13 0.44 C 41.86 46.88 
B 0.15 0.44 C 41.95 46.96 B 0.12 0.41 
Table 2. Social network clusters and their statistics per year; 
Note: D= degree, E=normalised eigenvector, C=normalised closeness; B=normalised betweenness 
 
 
As discussed in the literature review section, we considered two groups of board characteristics: 
board resource-provision characteristics and board-monitoring and incentive characteristics. In this 
step, the clustering model was applied to each set of attributes separately in order to find the 
clusters. First, the K-Means algorithm was applied to board resource-provision variables, which are 
board tenure, board size and social network clusters obtained from the previous step. Table 3 
presents the clusters in each year. The recorded Silhouette in each year is 0.7, which indicates that 
the clustering quality is fair in each year. The order of variables in all years is the same. Apparently 
the social network variable is the most important variable to distinguish two clusters. It is now 
possible to appreciate how firms that are members of the socially connected (SC) cluster also 
possess better indicators in terms of board resource provision. Considering the results in 2009, it can 
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be concluded that socially connected (SC) firms have a greater average of board size. However, 
lower board tenure indicates that the average number of years the firms’ directors have served on 
the board is smaller. This means that firms have hired directors more recently. Therefore, it is more 
likely that directors have more knowledge and expertise in relation to environmental performance 
through their previous directorships in other firms. The same results appear between firms in the 
years 2010 and 2011. Therefore, the first cluster (C1) is defined as a “board with poor resource 
provision role” (RPpoor) cluster and the second as a “board with rich resource provision role” (RPrich) 
cluster. The clusters in each year follow the same pattern. 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Silhouette 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Cluster number C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 
Cluster size (%) 60 40 60.2 39.8 57.9 42.1 
Social network connectedness SI SC SI SC SI SC 
Board size 10.71 12.54 10.71 12.54 10.65 12.27 
Board tenure 10.38 9.80 10.38 9.80 10.43 10.11 
Table 3. Board resource-provision clusters and their statistics per year; 
Note: SI=socially independent, SC=socially connected 
 
At this stage, we turned our attention to clustering the board-monitoring and stock-incentive 
variables. The K-Means model was applied to the data in each year. Table 4 presents the results in 
each year; two clusters in each year are identified namely board with high monitoring role and board 
with low monitoring role. The recorded Silhouette for each year indicates that the quality of 
clustering is fair. Considering the results in 2009, it can be concluded that in cluster C1 the number 
of independent directors is higher than in cluster C2. Stock ownership is as expected; insider–
directors own more stock, which encourages them to protect shareholder interests more. In 
addition, outsider–directors own little stock, which means they are not particularly dependent on 
firm stock and they can influence the board’s decisions and monitor firm management 
independently. On the other hand, the number of CEOs owning a high percentage of stock, as well as 
CEO–chairman duality, is higher. One possible interpretation of this is that CEO interests could be in 
line with shareholder interests because of their share ownerships. In this case, we should not be too 
concerned about the contrasts between CEO and shareholders’ interests. In this situation, higher 
CEO–chairman duality could help the CEO and board to be more focused on the decision-making 
process related to shareholder’s interests. 
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 2009 2010 2011 
Silhouette 0.6 0.7 0.7 
Cluster number Metrics (%) C1 C2 Metrics(%) C1 C2 Metrics(%) C1 C2 
Cluster size (%) 54.7 45.3 78.5 21.5 48.4 51.6 
 CEOOwn 76.40 6.25 InsiderOwn 80.85 22.46 CEOOwn 77.65 7.14 
OutsiderOwn 19.09 43.85 OutsiderOwn 19.15 77.54 OutsiderOwn 18.36 44.58 
InsiderOwn 80.91 56.15 CEOOwn 56.06 9.31 InsiderOwn 81.64 55.43 
IndDir 85.28 80.09 IndDir 83.83 81.67 IndDir 86.57 81.92 
CEO duality 0.11 0.08 CEO duality 0.08 0.07 CEO duality 0.08 0.02 
Table 4. Board-monitoring clusters and their statistics per year; 
Note: CEOown= CEO ownership; Outsiderown= outsider–director ownership; Insiderown= insider–director ownership; 
IndDir= independent director; CEO duality= CEO–chairman duality 
 
This stage profiles the firms’ environmental governance with respect to the board-monitoring and 
board resource-provision profiles. Table 5 shows the results. The environmental governance 
variables are paying incentives (PI), publishing climate change information (CCP) and the climate 
change responsible team (CCR). The general pattern each year is that when the board is in a better 
position in terms of monitoring and resource provision, there is a high possibility (at least 77.9%) 
that the board will be directly responsible for climate change issues in the firm. They publish the 
climate change information in the firms’ annual reports and voluntary reports. In addition, they pay 
incentives for environmental activities to entitled people.  
 2010 2011 2012 
Silhouette 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Cluster number Metrics C1 C2 Metrics C1 C2 Metrics C1 C2 
Cluster size (%) 54.2 45.8 53.5 46.5 55.5 44.5 
 
PI 
Yes 
(77.0%) 
No 
(77.7%) 
CCR 
SM 
(59.9%) 
Board 
(89.1%) 
BM 
Low 
(78.7%) 
High 
(82.3%) 
CCP 
7 
(75.4%) 
3 
(40.8%) 
PI 
No 
(58.4%) 
Yes 
(97.5%) 
BRP 
Poor 
(84.4%) 
Rich 
(75.2%) 
CCR 
Board 
(91%) 
Board 
(46.6%) 
CCP 
2 
(28.5%) 
6 
(37.0%) 
PI 
Yes 
(60.3%) 
Yes 
(90.3%) 
BM 
High 
(74.6%) 
Low 
(68.9%) 
BRP 
Poor 
(70.1%) 
Rich 
(51.3%) 
CCR 
SM 
(48.2%) 
Board 
(77.9%) 
BRP 
Rich 
(59%) 
Poor 
(82%) 
BM 
High 
(76.6%) 
High 
(80.7%) 
CCP 
2 
(29.1%) 
6 
(37.2%) 
Table 5. Board and environmental governance clustering and their results per year 
Note: PI=pay incentives, CCP= climate change publishing, CCR=climate change responsibility, board monitoring= BM; 
BRP= board resource provision 
 
To this point, we have discovered that when the board has higher monitoring of management and is 
also resource-rich, it is directly responsible for climate change issues in the firm and is definitely 
paying incentives and publishing climate change information. When firms were responding to the 
CDP questionnaire, if the firm confirmed the payment of incentives then they had to answer two 
more questions to specify who was entitled to benefit from these incentives and the type of 
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incentives involved. Figure 2 presents the type of incentives for each group, or individuals, entitled 
to incentives. In Figure 2, panel A, the type of incentives for the board are plotted. It is clear that 
monetary incentives are higher than other types of incentive. Boards received the highest 
percentage of monetary incentives in 2011. Paying recognition incentives to the boards increased 
slightly from 2011 to 2012. However, the percentage of non-monetary incentives remained 
relatively stable. Figure 2, Panel B indicates the type of incentives for the sustainability team. This 
group also received a very high percentage of monetary incentives. While their non-monetary 
incentives declined from 2010 to 2012, there was a significant increase in the percentage of 
recognition and monetary incentives from 2010 to 2012. As shown in Figure 2, Panel C, firms are 
paying a higher percentage of monetary incentives to other managers in the firm compared to non-
monetary and recognition incentives. In contrast to the boards and sustainability team, the 
recognition incentives for this group declines over time.  
 
Panel A. Board 
 
Panel B. Sustainability team  
 
Panel C. Other managers 
 
Panel D. All employees 
Figure 2. Percentage of three types of incentive per the entitled group for incentives 
Figure 2, Panel D shows the percentage of the type of incentives assigned to all employees in the 
firm. Unlike the other three groups, employees are entitled to recognition incentives that are much 
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higher than other types of incentive. The reason could be that when the board has direct 
responsibility for climate change issues in the firm, it is more likely to promote the environmental 
agenda through giving incentives to all employees. 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This work has explored the extent to which a board of directors with both monitoring and resource-
provision roles affects a firm’s environmental governance. We identified the potential advantage of 
the appointment of experienced directors to the board and their social networking with directors 
from other firms to create value in relation to the firm’s environmental governance. In addition, a 
board with an effective monitoring role can help management to pursue environmental governance. 
We investigated the relationship between environmental governance and several board 
characteristics, which are categorised as the monitoring role of directors linked to agency theory and 
the resource-provision role of directors linked to resource-dependence theory. Consistent with 
resource-dependence theory, we show that board social network connections are the most 
important factor in providing information. Boards with better social network connectedness, larger 
board size and lower board tenure are classified as resource-rich boards. Consistent with agency 
theory, the board of directors monitors the implementation of decisions made by the board. 
Effective boards increase their monitoring of management when there are a higher number of 
independent directors on the board, higher CEO–chairman duality, higher share ownership for 
insiders and CEOs and lower share ownership for outsider–directors. 
In addition, a resource-rich board with an effective monitoring role tends to have a board, or a 
committee appointed by the board, to be responsible for environmental initiatives, paying incentives 
for the management of climate change issues and publishing information in annual reports, 
voluntary communications or other regulatory filings.  
Research on the environmental profile of firms limits their environmental variable to just one 
variable, such as CO2 emissions (Misani and Pogutz 2015) or KLD strengths (de Villiers et al. 2011), 
because they need to have one dependent variable in the statistical model, such as regression 
analysis. This study employs data-mining techniques, which provide us with the opportunities to find 
patterns between a set of board characteristics and a set of environmental governance using a 
clustering technique. In addition, we use the integration of agency theory and resource-dependence 
theory to define the role of the board of directors in terms of monitoring and resource-dependence 
theory. Our analysis presents the finding that two complimentary roles are necessary in relation to 
environmental governance. In addition, the social network between boards of directors is defined as 
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one of the important factors that could facilitate access to resources and information based on the 
position of firms in the network. Various social network centrality metrics are employed to describe 
the position of the board of directors. Therefore, our study is the first to justify the social network 
based on resource-dependence theory and to consider its impact on environmental governance. 
The practical implication of our study is for firms interested in developing their environmental 
profile. Taking into consideration the importance of the board of directors in relation to the board 
resource-provision and monitoring role, firms should be more careful when appointing directors. 
The board needs directors who are knowledgeable in the environmental domain and can provide the 
relevant resources through their expertise and social networks with other sources. When the board 
has a reasonable level of understanding of environmental profile and an effective monitoring 
capability, it is able to pursue managers for business opportunities related to environmental 
products and services. In other words, firms should set up board structures and characteristics for an 
environmental profile. They should consider not only static board characteristics such as board 
independence, but also rational characteristics such as social network.  
We acknowledge that our study has several limitations. First, this study analyses a period of three 
years; a longitudinal study approach covering an extended period of time would reveal more 
patterns. The main reason for this is that an environmental agenda usually requires long-term plans 
and investment. Second, the study focuses on board characteristics. However, we cannot ignore the 
role of firm characteristics such as firm age, firm size, industry sensitivity and the firm’s financial 
situation in terms of environmental investment. Third, our sample comprises mainly the S&P1500 
firms in the US, which are large firms (large-cap US equities). Although it is obvious that large firms 
are more visible and, as a result, more active in the environmental agenda and engaging in various 
voluntary environmental programmes, for small- and medium-sized firms the link between board 
social networking and other board characteristics with environmental profile could be different. 
Beyond our study’s limitations, there are a number of promising areas of future research. First, 
based on the resource-dependence theory, this study shows that knowledge and information 
gathered by members of the board leads the board of directors to pursue better environmental 
practices. Future research could explore the importance of board environmental experience such as 
membership of an environmental committee or their previous role involving environmental-related 
programmes. Second, following other studies that integrate agency theory and resource-
dependence theory (Hillman and Dalziel 2003)(de Villiers et al. 2011)(Zona et al. 2015), our study 
also provides support for this integration. By taking into consideration that the board decision-
making process is complex, the use of any of these theories alone may not be sufficient. Therefore, 
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the integration of agency and resource-dependence theories could provide more insight into other 
board-related outcomes. Third, this research employs the common social network centrality metrics. 
For future research, we recommend exploring the evolution of the board social network 
(Shahgholian et al. 2012) and how social network evolution could affect firms’ environmental 
profiles.  
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